A certificate of authenticity for tokenised shares on Robinhood Chain. Paste a contract address or a ticker; every answer arrives with the evidence that produced it.

contacting the server…

Check a token

Try

How a verdict is reached

Six layers, every one of them a call to the chain

Anyone can deploy a contract whose symbol() returns “AAPL”. Names prove nothing, and the block explorer’s labels are metadata, not evidence. What cannot be faked is structure: the canonical tokens are beacon proxies issued by one factory, and every one of them is byte-identical to the same 283-byte runtime. These are the six questions asked of every address.

  1. Contract code exists eth_getCode is read at the address. No runtime means there is nothing to verify - an ordinary wallet, or a contract that has been destroyed.
  2. Beacon delegation The runtime must delegate through the shared beacon 0xe10b6f6b…51b00, compiled in as an immutable, with the EIP-1967 slot agreeing.
  3. Runtime is canonical, byte for byte 283 bytes, hashed and compared with the canonical proxy runtime (keccak 0x6c1fdd4000…). One byte out is out.
  4. Implementation and issuance The beacon must resolve to the implementation the registry serves, and the address must appear in the StockFactory’s own deployment list. Anyone may copy public bytecode; only the factory can issue a token.
  5. Metadata reads symbol(), name() and decimals() are read on chain. This is the weakest layer - it is reported, never trusted.
  6. Supply arithmetic totalSupply × uiMultiplier / 1e18 must equal totalSupplyUI() exactly. A contract that fakes the surface rarely gets the arithmetic right.

A check that could not be completed is reported as unverified - never as a forgery. A slow RPC is not evidence, and accusing a genuine token because a request timed out would be worse than saying nothing at all.